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Instructions on Death:
Guiding the Jury's Sentencing Discretion in Capital Cases
by Stephen Ellmann

Introduction
The men and women who sit on capital
juries rarely take their duties lightly.
Defense counsel tell them-and probably
they agree-that the decision to take a
defendant's life is awesome and difficult.
Unfamiliar with the law, no doubt inexperienced in sentencing, the jurors face a
confusing and painful task.
For this task jurors naturally seek, and
the law provides, some guidance. This
guidance, of course, is delivered by the
judge in instructions to the jury; these instructions have at least three functions,
each of which may be critically important
for defense counsel.
First, instructions may explicate crucial
legal issues (such as the nature of aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
the burdens of proof shouldered by prosecution and defense, the process of
weighing the various circumstances pointing for and against death), and a host of
other specific points bearing on the jury's
decision. These points matter. Carefully
prepared instructions can illuminate the
· jurors' duties in ways that heighten their
awareness of their responsibility to avoid
an improper sentence of death; ill-prepared
instructions may encourage the jury to
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view its task as a mechanical one, in which
the state's accumulation of aggravating circumstances automatically leads to a death
sentence.
Second, even if-as seems likely-many
of the instructions given by judges are too
technical, or confusing, or extended for
jurors to recall their details accurately, the
instructions given by the court help set the
mood for the jurors' deliberations. Instructions that highlight aggravating circumstances and give only passing reference to
mitigating circumstances may lead jurors
to give more weight to the state's reasons
for death than they otherwise would; conversely, instructions that set out in detail
the factors or evidence in mitigation may
encourage jurors to accept those factors as
significant. Moreover, in closing argument
counsel can rely on favorable instructions
and underscore them for the jury while also
buttressing the closing argument itself.
Third, the instructions given (and those
requested but refused) become the basis for
appeal . .lftimely requests for instructions
are made, and if timely objections are
made to instructions that jeopardize the
defendant's rights, then the client may ,
literally, live to fight another day.
It goes without saying that instructions
are vitally important at both guilt and
penalty phases. This article will focus only
on the penalty phase, however, and even
within this field it will not be exhaustive,
for the range of instructions that defendants
may need at penalty trials is as broad as
the range of issues and evidence at those
trials. In the pages to come I will try only
to highlight some of the central issues on
which instructions can be helpful, and the
sorts of instructions that counsel may want
to offer on them. The rest, as always, is

up to the attorneys in each indi
case. 1

Preparation and Presentation
of Instructions
Precisely because every case will call
slightly different instructions, it is
tial for counsel to plan and prepare the
structions before trial. Just as a
attorney must devise a theory of the
that will sustain the defense through
guilt and sentencing, so he or she
devise instructions that buttress the
theory in every way possible.
The first step, then, is a careful
ment of the strengths and weaknesses
the defense case. If, for example,
defendant's hopes for a life term
on nonstatutory mitigating cir1:un1Stancert
counsel should prepare instructions
highlight the presence of the noJ1StllttulOI
circumstances and emphasize the
power (or even duty) to consider
Otherwise, the mere fact that they are
specified by the state statute may ·
against the jury's considering them.
In light of this assessment, counsel
formulate the instructions that would
most helpful to the case. Some states
courts may have form instructions,
these should certainly be
although the purpose may be more to
tify instructions which must be
than to fmd models whose use

I.

I am grateful to James Liebman, .
Amsterdam, Timothy K. Ford and DeOIIIS
for numerous suggestions which I have
porated into this article, generallY
specific attribution .
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sought. Fortunately, model instructionslikely to be helpful starting points in almost
any case-are a~ailable from_a nu~ber of
sources, includmg the Califorma State
Public Defender's California Death Penalty Manual. the Kentucky Public Advocate's
Death Penalty Manual, the Indiana Public
Defender Counsel's Death Penalty
Defense, the Ohio Death Penalty Task
Force and Criminal Defense Lawyers
Association's Ohio Death Penalty Manual,
the Southern Poverty Law Center's Motions for Capital Cases, and probably
others. fve drawn extensively on some of
these sources in the discussion that follows.
Just as important as the drafting of the
instructions is the decision on strategy for
seeking their acceptance by the court. A
crucial element in this decision, in tum,
is thorough research of the relevant law.
Obviously, it is ideal if the instructions the
case calls for are supported by relevant
precedent. This precedent may rest on the
federal constitution, state constitution, or
state statutes, rules or decisions; all should
be consulted.
Even if an instruction is not currently required by law, it may well make sense to
request that it be given. The court may,
after all, have ample discretion to give the
instruction if it chooses. Moreover, even
an instruction that is currently rejected by
governing law may also be well worth requesting, if only to secure the issue for appeal. On the other hand, if a case looks
winnable at trial, it could conceivably be
best not to raise weak legal claims for improved instructions-if the result may be
to trigger the prosecution's interest in obtaining obstructions that are even worse
than those otherwise likely to be given.
Assuming that it makes strategic sense
to ask for a given instruction, counsel of
course must decide how vigorously to
press for its acceptance. But whether a particular instruction is urgently needed at
trial, or instead is expected to serve
Primarily as the basis for argument on appeal, counsel should assert all possible
legal grounds for its appropriateness. One
straightforward way of ensuring that important legal rights are not waived by
omission is to preface the entire set of proposed instructions with a written motion
u~ging that they be given, in light of the
SIXth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution and ap-

propriate parts of the state's constitution
and laws.
Where an instruction is crucially needed,
of course, counsel should be prepared to
press for it. Important Supreme Court
decisions offer both logic and language that
can be brought to bear in this effort.
"[C]areful instructions on the law and how
to apply it" were endorsed in Gregg v.
Georgia , 428 U.S. 153, 193 (1976)
(plurality opinion). Indeed, it is difficult .
to understand how , without clear instruc~
tions, sentencing juries can arrive at decisions that provide a "meaningful basis for
distinguishing the few cases in which
[death] is imposed from the many cases in
which it is not," Furman v. Georgia, 408
U . S. 238, 313 (1972) (White , J.,
concurring).
The absence of such instructions in fact
contributed to the Supreme Court's overturning of the death sentence in Godfrey
v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 429 (1980)
(plurality opinion). Similarly, in Caldwell
v. Mississippi, 86 L.Ed.2d 231, 246
(1985), the Supreme Court struck down a
death sentence, in part because the trial
court, rather than giving "a strong curative
instruction," had expressed agreement with
comments by the prosecutor that risked
undermining the jury's sense of responsibility in death sentencing. Moreover,
even under state statutes that deliberately
leave some aspects of the sentencing decision to the jury's discretion-as we now
know that Georgia does, see Zant v.
Stephens , 462 U .S. 862, 890 (1983)Gregg's principles continue to support
pressing for careful instructions concerning those aspects of the decision which the
system (purportedly) guides more
precisely .
When an instruction is important, moreover, one version of it may not be enough.
The best possible instructions are likely to
be the most open to objection from the
prosecution, and if counsel has no fallback
instructions prepared, wholly unobjectionable aspects of the defense instructions
may be lost in the shuffle. It is also possible that pressing for the best possible instructions will help persuade the court to
grant at least the second-best- though
pressing for too many ideal and unwinnable instructions may jeopardize counsel's
credibility.
While the decisions about whether and

how vigorously to press for particular instructions are delicate ones, sad experience
suggests that counsel should at least think
very carefully before not raising any
available legal claim. Death penalty trials
can end in death sentences, and the fate of
the defendant after that judgment is likely
to depend in large measure on whether his
trial attorneys have preserved the grounds
for appeal. That may later save him. For
the same reason, it is essential that all proceedings concerning instructions (and objections to them) be on the record.
With these thoughts in mind, let us consider more specifically what sentencing
phase instructions should cover and how
they can do so best. But first, these
caveats: Many, probably most, of the instructions given as examples in the
following pages embody strongly prodefense interpretations of the law; if these
examples are offered in actual trials,
counsel should be ready to respond with
alternative formulations in case the court
rejects the instructions suggested here.
Similarly, the citations given in this article are generally meant to provide a starting point in seeking positive authority;
counsel should be aware that there are
many adverse decisions on these issues as
well. Finally, the instructions suggested
here are suggestions- in every case,
counsel must decide which instructions will
best serve the needs of the client, in light
of the client's chances at trial and on
appeal.

Issues to Be Covered
The issues that sentencing instructions
need to address are as broad and complex
as the issues of the capital sentencing decision itself. Space does not permit a discussion in detail of the kinds of language
defense counsel may need to seek on all
of these issues. But it is possible to outline
the topics that comprehensive capital instructions should cover and to address
more thoroughly certain important themes
in the instructions that defense counsel
should proffer.

The Life-or-Death Nature of the
Sentencing Decision
The very first instruction2 should immediately remind the jurors that "their
April 1986/the CHAMPION 21
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task . .. [is] the serious one of determining
whether a specific human being should die
at the hands of the State." Caldwell v.
Mississippi , supra, 86 L.Ed.2d at 240.
They should be encouraged, in this instruction and throughout, to think of the defendant as a person with a name , rather than
"the defendant," and so he should always
be referred to by his name (and perhaps
as "Mr."). They should also be made aware
of the nature of their choice, and so, if
possible, the opening instruction should
identify the method of death (rather than
leaving execution as an abstraction). It
should also identify the alternative to
death, in as firm language as the state's law
will support; for example, the alternative
may be described as "life imprisonment,"
with further explanations, if any , of the
availability of parole postponed until later.
Thus an opening instruction might read:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury,
it is now your duty to determine
what punishment must be imposed
upon (name ofdefendant) . You must
determine which of the following
punishments is appropriate to impose
on (name of defendant):
1) Life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole;
or
2) Death by electrocution.3
The Basic Steps in the
Sentencing Decision
Before the jurors can understand the
nature of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, or the burdens of proof applying to them , or a variety of other matters,
they need a basic framework. Suppose we
have a death penalty statute that requires
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of one
statutory aggravating circumstance as a
predicate for death-eligibility , and then

2.

3.

This discussion focuses on the instructions to be
given after the evidence at the penalty phase has
been presented. It may also be very helpful to
have initial instructions to the jury before the
sentencing hearing gets under way. Defense
counsel should seek to insure that such initial instructions share the emphasis of the post-hearing
instructions, as discussed throughout this article,
on reinforcing the jury's caution about imposing
death.
Southern Poverty Law Center, Motions f or
Capital Cases 203 (1981 ).
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provides for a weighing of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances to arrive at a final
decision. It is important for the jury to
know, first, that death is out of the question unless a statutory aggravating circumstance is proven, and , second, that
even if such a circumstance is shown, the
question of sentence is still far from decided. These points might be made this
way:
In deciding whether to sentence
(name of defendant) to life imprisonment without parole or death by
electrocution, you will first have to
determine whether the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that
a statutory aggravating circumstance
exists in this case. (Name of defendant) cannot be sentenced to death
by electrocution unless each juror
finds beyond a reasonable doubt the
existence of one statutory aggravating circumstance. I will explain
what a statutory aggravating circumstance is shortly, but you should
understand that the fact that you have
found (name of defendant) guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder in the first degree
is not itself a statutory aggravating
circumstance.
Therefore, unless you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt at
least one statutory aggravating circumstance, you cannot even consider sentencing (name ofdefendant)
to death .
Even if you unanimously find the
existence of one statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a
reasonable doubt, you are not then
authorized to impose the death
penalty on (name of defendant). This
finding merely authorizes you to
consider imposing the death sentence . In deciding then whether to
sentence (name of defendant) to
death by electrocution, you are
bound by law and by your oath as
jurors to consider those mitigating
circumstances which I will list for
you later, and any other mitigating
evidence which you find in the case,
before imposing a sentence.
It will then be your duty, in accordance with the instruction I am about
to give you, to make a moral assessment of the circumstances of the case

as they reflect on the ultimate question of life or death: whether (name
of defendant) should be sentenced to
life imprisonment without parole or
to death by electrocution.4
This instruction by no means vv•uv''"ffl••
describes the weighing process that
J·ury will carry out and on which
tions are certainly needed. It may well
valuable also to describe that weighing
cess briefly here, if it is one that c:~r••h•'"' ..
protects defendants. If not, the ·
given above offers a general guideline,
meant to convey an overall sense of
necessity of caution and care in the sentencing process, and is compatible witha
variety of more specific instructions later
concerning the details of the
process .
Definition and Proof of
Aggravating Circumstances

•

Juries often find aggravating cir
cumstances in capital cases. It is ...,.,.,,"""""'•
however, that jurors not be permitted
rely on circumstances that are not
or have not been adequately proven. lU!J
instructions can help insure against
risks , although counsel should bear in
that unduly elaborate instructions
ing aggravation themselves carry the rist
of unintentionally focusing the jury's
thoughts on the aggravating
in the case. Ideally, instructions to the jUJ1
on aggravating circumstances should:
1) narrowly and precisely define each
aggravating circumstance;
2) limit the aggravating circumstances
that the jury will be allowed to consider;
3) specify the burden of proof that mu.C
be met by the State;
4) explain the presumption of ir.mocence;
and
5) limit the evidence the jury may
consider.
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This instruction is drawn largely from theK~
tucky Public Advocate's Death Penalty M~
159 ( 1979) (hereinafter cited as Ken__ ~
Manual) ; Southern Prisoners' Defense Coo•"'"
· ar~
tee et a!., Supplemental Materials, Senun
kiill
Improving Special Criminal Defense S E-(Nashville, TN , October 24, 1981), Part IV.
at 8 [hereinafter cited as Seminar Mate~
People v. Albert Brown, 40 Cal.3d 512, 220
Rptr. 637 , 709 P.2d 440 (1985).
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Narrow and Precise Definition

ManY of the aggravating circumstances
ified in modern death penalty laws are
specgue some of them exceptionally so.
va •
Others may be clear enough to lawyers,
b 1 not at all self-explanatory for lay
.;ors. None of these ambiguities should
permitted if ~ey :xpa~d the grounds on
which jurors rrught unagme they can find
an aggravating circumstance proven.
For example, counsel should press for
narrowing definition of the "heinous,
8
atrocious or cruel" circumstancespecifying, p:rhaps, that s~ch an_ offense
must involve torture, that IS, senous and
deliberate physical abuse of the victim
before death, or the pitiless infliction of unnecssary pain on the victim. 115 Similarly,
if the instructions defining homicide at the
guilt phase and those de~ing aggravating
circumstances at sentencmg appear to permit a death sentence against a person who
neither took life, attempted to take life, nor
intended to take life or that lethal force be
employed, in violation of Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), then this
serious error should be challenged, both
by a motion to bar or dismiss the death
penalty from the case and, if that fails , with
corrective instructions. 6
Sometimes the issues needing clarification will be more intricate. If, for example, it is an aggravating circumstance that
a murder was committed in the commission of robbery, it may be very important

k

5. Cf State v. Sonnier, 402 So.2d 650 , 659 (La.
1981), cen. denied, 463 U .S. 1229 (1983) ; see
also Mills v. State , 476 So.2d 172, 178-79 (Fla.
1985) (per curiam) (opinion for Justices Ehrlich ,
Shaw, and perhaps Alderman) .
6. After this article was in draft, the Supreme Court
decided Cabana v. Bullock, 54 U.S.L.W . 4105
(U.S. Jan. 21, 1986). The trial jury in Bullock's
case had returned a death sentence on the basis
of instructions that did not require it to find the
level of culpability mandated by Enmund, but the
Court held that this death sentence could still
Stand "provided only that the requisite findings
are made in an adequate proceeding before some
appropriate tribunal- be it an appellate court, a
trial judge, or a jury." /d. at4109. Probably most,
1f not all, states will nonetheless continue to entrust this decision in the first instance to the trial
sentencer. As a result, Bullock makes it all the
more important that a sentencing jury be correctly
lllSlructed- since a failure to give correct instruchons may now be held to call only for appellate
factfinding rather than for a new sentencing hearmg before a correctly instructed jury.

-depending on the facts and evidence-to:
1) instruct the jury on the elements of
robbery, and direct them that they cannot
find this aggravating circumstances unless
they find that each of the elements of robbery has been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt;
2) instruct the jury (if this is not a question of law for the court) that the homicide
must be an integral part of the commission
of robbery, rather than, for example,
merely close in time to the robbery, see
generally, People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1,
164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468, 504-06
(1980); or
3) instruct the jury that they must find
that the homicide was committed with the
intent to aid the commission of the
robbery.
Undoubtedly there will be many other
such issues revealed by a close reading of
applicable statute and case law. It is important not to assume that state law will
be unfavorable, for courts in such states
as Florida, illinois, Louisiana, and Tennessee have in fact sought to articulate
careful definitions of aggravating factors.
Even when state law is not helpful, federal
constitutional law may call for narrowing
constructions. See, e.g., Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). 7 Where
the facts raise these issues, they should not
be overlooked.
Limitation of Aggravating
Circumstances
In particular, counsel should seek to bar
the jury from considering nonstatutory aggravating circumstances (especially if state

7.

I am grateful to James Liebman for identifying
these sources of potentially useful case law.

law supports this limitation). Even if state
law permits consideration of nonstatutory
aggravation, it may still be possible to narrow the range of nonstatutory circumstances that the jury will consider.
Whatever the applicable rule on nonstatutory aggravating circumstances, counsel
should not overlook other possible limits
on the circumstances that the jury can be
instructed to consider. Moreover, "[w]here
it is doubtful whether a particular aggravating circumstance should be submitted," counsel should maintain, with the
North Carolina Supreme Court, that "the
doubt should be resolved in favor of defendant. " State v. Oliver, 274 S.E.2d 183,
204 (N.Ca. 1981). There are a number of
possible sources for such limits on aggravating circumstances.
First, in cases where a defendant has
already gone through one or more penalty
trials, any aggravating circumstance which
was not found against him in the prior
trial(s)-whether or not it was submitted
to the prior sentencing judges or juriesand any aggravating circumstance for
which the evidence was ultimately held
constitutionally insufficient (either in state
or federal court) should be objected to on
double jeopardy and heightened reliability
grounds , see Young v. Georgia, 79
L.Ed.2d 198 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); cf Jones
v. Florida, 459 U.S. 891 (1982) (Marshall,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari);
State v. Silhan, 275 S.E.2d 450, 480-83
(N.Ca. 1981).
Second, double jeopardy, heightened
reliability and due process, and equal protection concerns also can be invoked to
support objections to aggravating circumstances that constitute elements of the
offense of which the defendant has been
convicted (such as an "in the commission
of a felony" circumstance where the defini-
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tion of capital homicide is "killing in the killing during an escape9 ) .
course of specified felonies"), see Collins
Specify Burden of Proof
v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 258, 261-65 (8th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 54 U .S.L.W.
Typical statutes require that the jury
3375 (U.S. Dec. 3, 1985); State v. Cherry,
257 S.E.2d 551, 567-68 (N.Ca. 1979), unanimously find at least one statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasoncert. denied, 446 U .S. 941 (1980).
Third, overlapping or duplicative aggra- able doubt, and this limit should of course
vating circumstances (e.g., that the murder be repeated. It should also be made explicit
was committed during a robbery and that that the jury cannot find additional agit was committed for pecuniary gain, or gravating circumstances unless this same
that each of two concurrent murders is a burden of proof is satisfied for each one.
"multiple murder" aggravating circum- If possible, each juror should also be restance to the other) should also be resisted quired not to take into account any other
on similar grounds, see People v. Harris, aggravating circumstances unless these,
36 Cal.3d 36, 60-67, 201 Cal. Rptr. 782, too, are found by the entire jury beyond
679 P.2d 433, 447-52 (1984) (plurality a reasonable doubt.
In jurisdictions that permit nonstatutory
opinion), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 365
(1984); State v. Goodman, 257 S.E.2d aggravating circumstances to be con569, 586-88 (N.Ca. 1979); Cook v. State, sidered, counsel may want to seek instruc369 So.2d 1251, 1256, 1258 (Ala. 1978); tions imposing the same limits on the
Provence v. State, 337 So.2d 783, 786 jurors' consideration of these nonstatutory
(Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U .S. 969 circumstances. Any such instructions,
however, should be phrased carefully so
(1977) .8
Fourth, aggravating circumstances that as not to inadvertently encourage the jury
on their face or as applied require a jury to consider nonstatutory aggravating cirthat has just convicted the defendant of a cumstances that it might otherwise have
murder to decide whether he committed ignored. One formulation that has been
another unrelated crime, for which he has suggested would tell the jurors that these
not already been found guilty, should be limits must be satisfied "before you conresisted as risking prejudiced and unre- sider any fact as an aggravating cirliable decisionmaking, see State v. McCor- cumstance."
mick, 397 N.E.2d 276 (Ind. 1979). At the
The instructions should also explain the
least, counsel should press for a require- meaning of the "beyond a reasonable
ment that any such other crimes be pro- doubt" standard, and should do so in terms
ven beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf Peo- that reinforce the jurors' sense of the gravple v. Robertson, 33 Cal.3d 21, 188 Cal. ity of their responsibility . For example:
Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279, 297-99, 303-04
In order to find that an aggravating
(1982) (plurality and concurring opinions).
circumstance has been proven to exFinally, state or federal law may of
ist you must be convinced of its excourse provide still other grounds for
istence beyond a reasonable doubt
resisting the state's use of aggravating cirand to a moral certitude. Proof of an
cumstances. Counsel should creatively exaggravating circumstance beyond a
plore, in particular, the possibility of
reasonable doubt is evidence by
formulating, and seeking instructions on,
which the understanding, judgment
defenses to aggravating circumstances (reand reason of the jury are well
quiring, for example, that the defendant
satisfied and convinced to the extent
have been aware of his victim's status as
of having a full, firm and abiding
a peace officer; or providing that facts
conviction that the circumstance has
showing duress, even though not sufficient
been proven to the exclusion of and
to make out a guilt phase defense, suffice
beyond a reasonable doubt.
to negate an aggravated circumstance of
A reasonable doubt as to the existence of an aggravating circumstance may arise from the
8.

Similarly, an instruction may be sought to prevent the overlapping use of aggravating evidence.
See text accompanying note 12 infra.

9.

The latter was suggested by James Liebman.

evidence presented or from the lack
want or insufficiency of the prosecu~
tion's evidence.
A reasonable doubt does not mean
that you have to give yourself a
specific reason for the doubt; it is
sufficient that you are not convinced
to an abiding certainty.
If you have a reasonable doubt as
to whether an aggravating circumstance is present, it is your duty to
fmd that it is not present. 10
Explain the Presumption of Innocense

•
•

•

The presumption of innocence should be
applied to each of the aggravating cir·
cumstances considered by the jury, and,
needless to say, should be phrased as
firmly as possible.
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Limit the Evidence
For example, instructions might fruit·
fully state that the fact that an aggravating
circumstance has been alleged against til
defendant is not evidence of its existence,
and should not be considered by til
jury, 11 that the jury may not consider any
evidence that is not relevant to one of til
aggravating circumstances being submit·
ted to it, or that circumstantial evidence
alone is not sufficient to prove the ex·
istence of an aggravating circumstance
beyond a reasonable doubt.
In addition, counsel may restate or supplement their opposition to the use
overlapping aggravating circumstancef
with an instruction, as has been suggested.
on these lines: "A fact which you
as the basis for finding one aggravating
cumstance may not also be considered bJ
you as the basis for fmding another at
gravating circumstance; you may consitkl
the same fact in aggravation only once,
more than once, even though it may
within the definition of more than a
aggravating circumstance which I
read to you."
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10. See Kentucky Manual , supra note 4, at 160.61·
For the last sentence, see New Mexico
~
Jury Instructions for death penalty cases,
39.22 (1980 version).
II . This instruction was suggested by TimothY g.
Ford.
12. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
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Definition and Proof of
Mitigating Circumstances
Instructions on mitigating circumstances
can help a defendant; they can also hurt.
It is essential that these instructions
highlight the defense case and its significance for the jury's deliberations- and it
is likely that standard instructions will fail
to do this as well as they should. Instructions in connection with mitigating circumstances should:
1) clarify the significance of mitigating
circumstances in the jury's decision;
2) identify and, if appropriate, explain
both the statutory and non-statutory mitigating circumstances which the jury may
consider; and
3) explain the burden of proof on mitigating circumstances.
Clarify the Significance of
Mitigating Circumstances
In an important series of cases, the
Eleventh Circuit (formerly the "Fifth Circuit Unit B") has decided that the constitution generally requires instructions which
explain to a jury " 'why the law allows ... a
consideration [of mitigating circumstances]
and what effect a fmding of mitigating circumstances has on the ultimate recommendation of sentence." ' Dix v. Kemp , 763
F.2d 1207, 1209 (11th Cir. 1985). Significantly, Dix adhered to this line of decisions
despite the Supreme Court's determination
in Zant v. Stephens, supra, 462 U.S. at
890, that "the Constitution does not require
a State to adopt specific standards for instructing the jury in its consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances."
See Dix, 763 F .2d at 1209 n.3 .
A typical formulation of these points
would be the following :
I charge you that mitigating circumstances are those which, in
fairness and mercy , may be considered as extenuating or reducing
the degree of moral culpability or
blame, and which, therefore, call for
the imposition of a punishment less
than the ultimate punishment. 13
Counsel may want to tender even more

13 . See Seminar Materials, supra note 4, Part IV.E. ,
at 3 .
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elaborate instructions, which explain, for
example, that mitigating circumstances are
those that tend to indicate that the deterrent or retrlbutive functions of punishment
would not be served in this case. See Liebman & Shepard, Guiding Capital Sentencing Discretion Beyond the "Boiler Platen:
Mental Disorder as a Mitigating Factor,
66 Geo. L.J. 757, 818-21 (1978) (hereafter
cited as "Liebman & Shepard") .
Explain Statutory and Nonstatutory
Mitigating Circumstances
Implicit in this guideline are seven important considerations.
First, mitigating circumstances may be
ambiguous . Even a seemingly clear factor
such as "age" may well need explanation
to highlight the range of ages that would
count as mitigating or to highlight nonchronological factors such as mental age
that might bring a defendant within the circumstance. An explanation of the reasons
that age counts as a mitigating factor- that
the immaturity of a defendant tends to
reduce his culpability and so to reduce the
appropriateness of the ultimate penalty may also be useful . (Counsel should, however , be careful to frame these explanations so as not to narrow inadvertently the
range of mitigating material that the jurors
understand they may consider and rely on
as reasons for giving a life sentence.)
Second, it is essential that mitigating circumstances that are not present in the case
not be presented to the jury. Typical
mitigation instructions may list, and submit, every mitigating circumstance,
whether it is present or not; the effect may
be to emphasize for the jurors the number
of mitigating circumstances that are missing from the case before them. Moreover,
statutory mitigating circumstances may be
defined very stringently-for instance, to
require "extreme emotional disturbance" to
show mitigation. If counsel believe that the
evidence does not meet the definitions of
related mitigating circumstances specified
in the statute, but that this evidence is
nonetheless mitigating, then they may well
want to prevent the statutory circumstances
in question form being submitted to the
jury, or at least to seek modifications in
the statutory language that would normally
be used in the instructions. 14
Third, if the defense case rests in whole
or in part on nonstatutory mitigating cir-

cumstances, it is extremely important that
these be presented to the jury with the~
emphasis as statutory circumstances.
Otherwise the jurors may infer that, COllJ.
pared to the statutory circumstances, ~
nonstatutory circumstances are less irnpor.
tant, or the jury is under less of an oblig.
tion to consider them. An instruction
directly telling the jurors to weigh and con.
sider both sets of circumstances equally
may be helpful . See generally People v.
Lucky, _
Cal.3d_ (Dec. 31 , 1985).
In State v. Johnson, 257 S.E.2d 597
614-17 (N.Ca. 1979), the North Caro~
Supreme Court recognized that an instm:tion "put[ting] some mitigating circumstances in writing and leav[ing] others to
the jury's recollection ," id. at 616-17.
might violate Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586 (1978), by effectively discouraging t1r
jury from considering relevant mitigating
circumstances.
Fourth, it is a reality of capital trials thtf
often the prosecution will be able to prove
the existence of multiple aggravating f~
tors . While instructions can then be sougll
that minimize the significance of merely
counting the number of factors , it behooves
defendants to seek to offer multiple miDgating factors as well. Often, this
will require the presentation of nnr1otatll- •
tory mitigating factors , and will also
for the careful identification of the
factors shown by the evidence.
Fifth , counsel should always
carefully the range of possible uu''"'"u...
circumstances, especially
mitigating circumstances, in the case,
seek instructions on those that seem
ising . These can include , but are
means limited to, an almost infinite
of facts about the offender himself and
circumstances of the crime. Another
gating circumstance could be the
of any remaining doubt about the
dant's guilt, for such doubt, even if
than a reasonable doubt, might still
against death. Cf Smith v. Balkcom,
F .2d 573 , 579-82 (5th Cir. Unit B
modified on other grounds, 671 F.2d

14. Even if counsel believe that their Pvi<lenct:""'la
satisfy the statutory standards, they
challenge such stringently defined
cumstances as unduly limiting the
sideration of mitigating evidence, in
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1 978).
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(Sth Cir. Unit B).' cert. denied, 459 U.S.
(1982) . A lighter sentence to a co882
defendant might als? be viewed by a jury
mitigating. So rmght the absence of an
asggravating cucumstance
.
(fior mstance,
.
~the defendant did not act for pecuniary
gain). And t?e defendant~s behavior in
·on since his arrest-which for a defenon retrial, may have been years
ago- may show evidence of rehabilitation
or nondangerousness, for instance, that
will be of mitigating value. The Supreme
Court is now considering the admissibility of evidence of past and likely future
good conduct of a defendant in prison in
Skipper v. North Carolina, No. 84-6859,
cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3252 (U.S.
()ct. 15, 1985) .
Sixth, the instructions should direct the
jury to give consideration to those
mitigating circumstances that it finds in the
case. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,
114-15 (1982), declares that the sentencer
"may determine the weight to be given
relevant mitigating evidence. But [the
sentencer] may not give it no weight by excluding such evidence from [its] consideration"; this instruction implements this
view. For similar reasons, counsel should
seek instructions requiring the jury·to fmd
the existence of those circumstances sufficiently demonstrated by the evidence
(under the applicable burden of proof) . Cf
State v. Johnson, 257 S.E.2d 597, 617-19
(N. Ca. 1979). (Instructions that direct the
jury's attention to mitigating evidence, if
permitted, may serve this same purpose to
some extent.) If appropriate-for example,
in a case in which the defendant is suffering from a mental illness which contributed
to his offense-counsel should also seek instructions directing the sentencing jury to
treat particular circumstances or evidence
as mitigating rather than as aggravating.
Cf Zant v. Stephens, supra, 462 U.S . at
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d~fendant. " 1 ~ Defmitions of mitigating
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evidence should all be drafted in light of
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!5. SeminarMaterials,supranote4, PartiV.E. al4.

the actual strengths and weaknesses of the
case. Instructions such as these are likely
to be especially important when the mitigating evidence is liable to be misunderstood or disregarded- as may be the case,
for example, with evidence of mental illness, which jurors may be reluctant to
credit or to view as mitigating. Support for
such instructions may be found, in such
cases, not only in death penalty jurisprudence but in general principles concerning
"prophylactic instructions on ... confusing
or prejudicial evidence." Liebman &
Shepard, supra, at 819-20 n.275.
An instruction briefly accomplishing
several of these objectives might read as
follows:
The Court instructs the jury that
in deciding whether to sentence
(name of defendant) to life imprisonment without parole or to death by
electrocution, you are bound by law
to consider all of the mitigating circumstances presented by the defense, and any other mitigating
circumstances that you find in the
case. That is, you should focus your
attention on those aspects of the case,
and in particular those characteristics
of the defendant, which, in fairness
and mercy, may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of
moral culpability or blame, and
which, therefore, call for the imposition of a punishment less than the
ultimate punishment. Thus, you
must consider the following factors
as evidence of mitigation if you
believe from the evidence that they
are present:
1. (Name of defendant) acted
under extreme duress or under the
substantial domination of another
person, _ _ _ _ __
2. (Name of defendant) did not
strike the fatal blow which caused
the death of the victim.
3. The age of (name ofdefendant),
20, at the time of the crime, and the
resultant immaturity that would
reasonably be expected to contribute
to his criminal conduct.
4. (Name of defendant)'s cooperation with the police.
5. (Name of defendant)'s prior
family history, including his having
been abused physically and emotionally as a child, that would

reasonably be expected to contribute
to his criminal conduct.
6. (Name of defendant)'s low intelligence and his suffering from
chronic depression that would reasonably be expected to contribute to
his criminal conduct.
7. Any other circumstance which
you consider mitigating even if I
have not mentioned it.
It may well be helpful to elaborate on
the last item on the list ("any other circumstance"), particularly if the court
refuses to identify nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances in its charge to the jury.
Such an elaboration might declare:
The mitigating circumstances
which I have read for your consideration are factors that you may take
into account as reasons for deciding
to impose a sentence of life imprisonment. You should pay careful attention to each of those factors. Any
one of them, standing alone, may be
sufficient to support a decision that
life imprisonment is the appropriate
punishment for (name of defendant).
However, you should not limit your
consideration of mitigating circumstances to the specific mitigating circumstances mentioned. You may
also consider any other circumstance
relating to the case or to (name of
defendant) as reasons for imposing
a sentence of life imprisonment. 16
Explain Burden of Proof on
Mitigating Circumstances
The instructions to present on the burden
of proof depend, of course, on what this
burden of proof is, and what party bears
it. Ideally, the answer might be that the
state must disprove beyond a reasonable
doubt any mitigating circumstance on
which the defense proffers evidence. This
rule would implement the requirement of
heightened reliability in death penalty
cases, see, e.g., Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)
(plurality opinion), by borrowing the standard developed to insure reliability in
determining "the degree of criminal

16. Seminar Materials, supra note4 , Part IV.E., at
6.
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culpability" at the guilt stage of even the
most mundane capital cases, Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S . 684, 698 (1975).
Unfortunately, arguments for this standard have not fared very well in the courts;
as a practical matter, it will be essential to
offer alternative instructions embodying
less favorable burdens of proof. These instructions should also explain the meaning
of the various formulas used, if such explanations will be helpful to the defense .
For example, counsel might offer the
following instructions (beginning with the
first or second and presenting the later
ones, in order, if the court rejects those
already presented) :17
If you have a doubt about the existence of a mitigating circumstance
then you shall find that that mitigating circumstance exists.
The prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the nonexistence of each of the mitigating
circumstances which I have listed for
you before you can find that such
circumstance does not exist. [Here
include a strong definition of
reasonable doubt.] If you have a
reasonable doubt as to whether a
mitigating circumstance has been
proven not to exist, it is your duty
to fmd that it is present.
In order for you to find the existence of a mitigating circumstance
it does not have to be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt to exist. You
must find the existence of a mitigating circumstance if there is any
evidence introduced to support it.
[Counsel may wish to vary this instruction or prepare a fall-back version, by adding a clause such as
"unless you are firmly convinced
from all of the evidence in the case
that this circumstance does not
exist.1
In order for you to find the existence of a mitigating circumstance
it does not have to be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt to exist. You
must fmd the existence of a mitigating factor if the existence of that
factor is in any degree more likely
than not. [Here it may be helpful to

17. See Kentucky Manual , supra note 4 , at 162-63.

28 the CHAMPION/April 1986

formulate further instructions emphasizing how modest this burden of
proof is , or the jurors' duty to adhere
to it.]
In addition, these instructions should
seek to ensure that each juror is free to consider as mitigating any factor that he or she
views as such, even if other jurors do not
agree that the factor is present or do not
view it is mitigating. If individual jurors
are denied this freedom , counsel should
seek at least to ensure that a mitigating circumstance is deemed to be present (and so
must be considered by the entire jury in
its weighing decision, or at least may be
considered by any juror) so long as a mere
majority (rather than the entire jury) find
it to be present. Finally , such instructions
should seek to insure that jurors are free
to consider mitigating evidence, even if
they do not find on the basis of that
evidence that a mitigating factor has been
proven to the requisite level of proof. See
Stebbing v. Maryland, 83 L.Ed. 2d 212 ,
214-15 (1984) (Marshall , J ., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) .

Clarify the Nature of the
Weighing Process
Modern death penalty statutes must
direct the jury's attention to the consideration of both aggravating and mitigating factors present in the case. Unfortunately,
current doctrine does not consider it essential for this purpose that "specific standards
for balancing aggravating against mitigating circumstances" be fashioned , nor,
apparently, that these factors be "explicitly
balanced against each other." See Zant v.
Stephens , supra, 462 U.S . at 875 & n.13
(discussing the Georgia and Texas death
penalty statutes).
Nonetheless , many , if not most, state
statutes do explicitly provide for some
form of balancing process. Even in those
states that do not, defense counsel may be
able to win instructions that offer considerable clarification of the role and significance of mitigating circumstances, or of
other aspects of the sentencing decision,
and proffering such instructions is likely
to be useful strategy.
In the discussion that follows , however,
I will assume that the applicable law does
expressly provide for a weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
The establishment of a weighing process

may be helpful for defendants, but it hardly
guarantees an adequate consideration of~
circumstances that should argue agaim1
death. As a result, instructions should see(
to ensure that the weighing process is ~
tilted towards execution. For this purpose
instructions on the following points a~
likely to be helpful.
The Decision Before the Jury
Is Not a Mechanical One
A number of state laws provide that after
the jury has found a statutory aggravating
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt,
it "shall" sentence the defendant to death
unless the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances. Such
"presumptions of death" should be attacked
as violations of the teaching of Woodsorr
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976),
which prohibited mandatory death penalty
statutes, and of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586 (1978), which required that sentence:rs:
not be precluded from considering any
propriate circumstances offered in
tion. Justice Marshall has also pointed
see Maxwell v. Pennsylvania, 83 L.Ed.
306 , 308-09 (1984) (Marshall , J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), that sucb
statutes can undermine the jurors' full
recognition of the oral responsibility they
bear in death sentencing, by focusing
on relatively mechanical issues peripheral
to the true question of life or death
potential violation of the teaching
Caldwell v. Mississippi, supra, which
sists on the importance of the jurors'
recognizing this responsibility .
response to these problems is to seek
structions which shift the weighing
mula, for example to require that
gravating circumstances be shown
outweigh mitigating circumstances, and
will set out such instructions in the
subsection.
Another response , however, is to
clear to the jury that it is never under a
to impose death unless it concludes as
matter of its own independent moral ·
ment that death is the appropriate
Instructions such as these are likely to
useful whatever the weighing formula isat least unless the defense is confident
a more formulaic application of the
ing standard will result in a sentence
than death. This response is strongly
ported by the California Supreme

recent decision in People v. Albert Brown,
suPra note 4, 40 Cal.3d 512 (1985); cf
StaJe v. McDougall, 301 S.E.2d 308,
325-26 (N.Ca.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
865 (1983). Instructions on this point might
say for example:
' As I have already explained to
you, if you find that the state has
proved beyond a reasonable doubt
the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances, it will then
be your duty to weigh any aggravating circumstance or circumstances that you fmd against any
mitigating circumstances that you
find in the case. I charge you that
your weighing of these circumstances should not consist of merely
adding up the number of aggravating
circumstances and mitigating circumstances. Rather, each juror is
free to assign whatever moral or
sympathetic value he or she deems
appropriate to each and all of the
various factors you are permitted to
consider.
[By directing that the jury "shall"
impose the death penalty if it finds
that aggravating factors "outweigh"
mitigating] (use the bracketed words
only if necessary), the law should not
be understood to require or even to
permit any juror to vote for the death
penalty for (name of defendant)
unless, upon completion of the
weighing process, he or she decides
that death is the appropriate penalty
under all the circumstances.
Moreover, the law does not intend ·
that (name of defendant) be sentenced to death if the jury merely
fmds more bad than good about him
or to permit life imprisonment without parole only if it fmds more good
than bad. The weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
must occur within the context of
these two punishments -life imprisonment without parole, or death by
electrocution- and the balance is not
between good and bad but between
life and death. Therefore, to return
a death judgment, each juror must be
persuaded that the "bad" evidence is
~ substantial in comparison with the
good" that it requires death instead
of life without parole.
Instructions should also make plain that

multiple aggravating circumstances do not
necessarily call for the death penalty, and
that a single mitigating circumstance may
call for a lesser penalty.
The Issues and the Burdens
Earlier sections of this article have
already discussed desirable instructions on
two burden of proof issues: the burdens of
proof of the existence of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. It is possible to
identify three distinct issues that may remain for the jury's consideration at the
"weighing" stage, and on at least two 18 of
these, instructions on the burden of proof
may be helpful.

The relative weights of the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances.
Counsel should press for instructions
that preclude death unless the jury finds
that the aggravating circumstances clearly outweigh the mitigating circumstances.
Another formulation, of similar import,
would direct the jury that "[i]f the weight
of the mitigating circumstances approaches
or exceeds the weight of the aggravating
circumstances then you cannot sentence
(name of defendant) to death by electrocution. "19 Without such provisions as these,
juries are free to impose death even when
the relevant circumstances are actually or
nearly in equipoise.
Whatever the "weighing" formula,
counsel should also press for a "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard. This standard
can be justified even if the courts decide
that "weighing" is not "fact-finding," for the
effect of the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard should be to insure that the jurors,
as they should, treat the weighing decision
with just as much seriousness as they
would the factfinding in a regular case. Accordingly, jurors could be charged, for example, that "unless you find that the state
has shown beyond a reasonable doubt that
the aggravating factors outweigh the
mitigating factors in this case, you cannot
sentence (name of defendant) to death by

18. The only possible exception would be the issue
of mercy, to which a "burden of proof" instruction may not readily apply.
19. See Kentucky Manual at 163.

electrocution." See State v. Wood, 648
P.2d 71, 83-85 (Utah), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 988 (1982). As in every burden of
proof context, counsel should be ready
with fall-back instructions if the most
favorable language is rejected.

The question of whether to grant mercy.
Death penalty systems may explicitly
authorize capital juries to grant mercy.
Even under statutues that do not, however,
defendants can argue for a right to jury
consideration of mercy on the grounds that
without such a right jurors may be precluded from giving mitigating circumstances the weight they otherwise would,
in violation of the teaching of Lockett v.
Ohio, supra. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Pennsylvania, 83 L.Ed. 2d 306, 308 (1984)
(Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); cf Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d
1449, 1460-61 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane)
(U.S. Appeal or petition for certiorari
pending). If it is possible to establish that
the jury is authorized to grant mercy, then
it may well be important to make sure that
the jur; is aware of this power. An instruction on mercy might read:
I charge you that if you see fit, and
regardless of your findings on the
other issues I have set out for you,
you are always free to afford [there
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is nothing that prevents you from affording] (name of defendant) mercy
in these proceedings and sentencing
him to life imprisonment without
parole.
You may grant mercy to (name of
defendant) regardless of the evidence
presented to you and even if you
have not found the existence of any
mitigating circumstances.
This decision is solely in your
discretion and not controlled by any
rule of law. Each juror may decide
to grant mercy to (name of defendant), with or without a reason .
You may in particular decide to
grant mercy to the defendant because
of [here describe the mitigating circumstances as proffered in the
case]-2°
Just as it is important to inform the jurors
of their power to grant mercy, it is important to resist instructions that might obscure
this power or otherwise interfere with the
jury's full consideration of mitigating circumstances. Traditional instructions to
render a verdict without consideration of
sympathy, or without regard to the consequences, should therefore be resisted-a
position endorsed by the California
Supreme Court. See, e.g., People v. Albert
Brown, supra note 4.

The overall appropriateness
of a death sentence.
The corollary of the effort to resist a
mechanical weighing process is the view
that the jury should not be able to return
a death verdict based on a mere weighing
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances but instead should be required
to address directly the question of the appropriateness of life or death for the defendantY If the jury is responsible for

20. See Southern Poverty Law Center, Motions for
Capital Cases 208 (1981); Seminar Materials ,
Part IV .E . at 9 .
21. If the weighing process has already ruled out the
death penalty, of course, there would be no
reason, and possibly no statutory authorization,
for the jury to reach this final question . Counsel
should seek instructions which make clear to the
jurors that decisions at various early or intermediate steps of the decisionrnaking process
will resolve the case by precluding the possibility
of a death sentence.
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sentencing, a failure to put this ultimate
issue squarely before them may be said to
undermine their sense of responsibility for
the decision as well as their attention to the
significance of mitigating factors or
grounds for mercy.
Justice Stevens expressed his concern
that the issues put to the jury not distort
their decisionmaking in Smith v. North
Carolina, 459 U .S. 1056 (1982) (Stevens,
J., opinion respecting the denial of petition for certiorari). Stevens' opinion quotes
from State v. Wood, supra, 648 P.2d at 83.
In light of Wood, and of State v.
McDougall, supra, 301 S.E.2d at 327-28
(McDougall is North Carolina's response
to Stevens' opinion in Smith), counsel
might seek the following instruction,
perhaps buttressed with further instructions
reminding the jury of the non-mathematical
nature of their decision:
In order to impose a death
sentence, you must be convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that the
totality of the aggravating circumstances outweighs the totality of the
mitigating circumstances. If you are
not convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances, you must return a
verdict of life imprisonment.
In order to impose a death sentence, you must further be convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that the
imposition of the death penalty is the
only justified and appropriate
sentence in the circumstances. If you
are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the imposition of the
death penalty is the only justified and
appropriate sentence in the ' circumstances, again you must return
a verdict of life imprismynent.
The jury's understanding of the care with
which it should approach a possible sentence of death can be further reinforced
with instructions on the presumption of innocence, or on what could be called the
death sentencing corollary of the presumption of innocence- the presumption of imprisonment. An instruction on this issue
might read:
The law presumes (name of defendant) innocent of the aggravating circumstances alleged against him, and
the law, consequently, presumes that
the appropriate sentence for the of-

fense of whic~ (na"!e ?f ~efendam)
has been convtcted ts hfe tmprisonment without parole.
You are further instructed that this
presumption alone is sufficient torequire you to sentence (name of
defendant) to life imprisonmem
without parole unless you conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt; that onl;
the sentence of death is appropriate
for (name of defendant).
The Consequences of Nonunanimity
Under many statutes, the death o""'-""'
can only be imposed if the jury
mously agrees to it; if the jury is split,
result is not a new trial but a sentence
imprisonment. Given the
pres.sures for agreement inside the
room, it is important for jurors syn1patbdkll
to the defendant to understand the
quences of their decisions. Otherwise,
bitrary pressure for unanimity may
in a death verdict in a case in which
munity sentiment, as reflected in the
would not call for execution. Even ·
law prohibits instructions on this
counsel generally should seek them
order to preserve this issue for
A strong statement of this point
be:
In order to return a sentence of
death , it is absolutely necessary that
all twelve (12) jurors agree on that
sentence.
If any juror does not believe the
sentence of death is warranted under
these instructions, then a sentence
life imprisonment without
will be imposed.
For the same reason, defense
should contend that the jury's
agree after a reasonable time
sentence of life imprisonment (even
law does not so provide). And for
the same reasons, counsel normally
vigorously resist any "Allen" or
charge designed to press the jury
unanimity.
The Meaning of the Possible
There are two critical concerns
First, it is important that the jury
stand that a death verdict means the
dant's death- rather than being
some form of symbolic gesture. It

therefore, to hav.e the jury instruc~
your deliberations on the questiOn
r....11nlSilll"'"'' you are to presume that if
ntence (name ofdefendant) to death,
se be executed by electrocution."
it is essential that the jury not
that the alternative to death is a
iillisttmem of no more than a few years'
There are three possible
of insuring against such misunder-

If the alternative punishment is fixed
Jaw at "life imprisonment without
it may be best to leave this
precisely as it is, on the theory
it is already as clear as it can be.
b) If the penalty is only "straight life,"
may ask for an instruction telling
jury "to presume that if you sentence
of defendant) to life imprisonment,
will spend the rest of his life in prison.
are to make no other presumptions."
method assumes that the jurors will
willing, after hearing this instruction,
put aside their suspicions about parole
commutation.
c) If the issue of parole cannot be so
dispelled, it may be best to meet it
To do so, one commentator has
;:'JUJ~e.!ited, counsel in such situations
seek instructions telling the jury not
that it should presume that life im}• 1· prisorunent indeed is imprisonment for
life, but also that in considering this
sentence the jurors should not assume that
lhe defendant will ever be paroled from it;
lhat the question of parole is committed to
a responsible official agency with a duty
to protect the public; and that the jury
should not imagine that such an official
agency will fail to do its duty to refuse
parole in any case in which the public
safety would not be fully protected if
parole were granted.
Reinforce the Jury's
Sense of Responsibility
The Supreme Court in Caldwell v.
Mississippi, supra, 86 L.Ed. 2d at 239-40,

)entencel
:rns hete.
ry undelthe deft'l'
g me~
It maybe

~phatically confirmed the constitutional
IDlportance of the jurors' sense of moral
~~nsibility. This sense of responsibil1~ Is easily diluted; indeed, many jurors
Wil! arrive with it diluted in advance, by
tberr .vague, and perhaps inaccurate, im~Slons of the likelihood of review by the
trial judge or by courts on appeal. It may

well be helpful, therefore, to seek an instruction on these lines: 22
You are instructed that this court
has no option in the present case to
impose any sentence other than the
sentence recommended by you, the
jurors. 23 •
This instruction should be sought even
in states where the jury's recommendation
is in fact subject to review by the trial
judge, on the ground that informing the
jury of the prospect of this review will
make their contribution to the sentencing
process less reliable and responsible. Even
in states which explicitly inform the jurors
that their decision is only a recommendation, it may well he helpful to seek instructions which emphasize the gravity of making such a recommendation, and the
limited circumstances (if they are limited)
under which the jury's recommendation
will be overturned.
Counsel should be careful, however, not
to leave the jurors with the impression that
a death verdict will receive further review,
while a verdict of life will be final- for that
perspective would tempt jurors to render
purely symbolic verdicts of death.

The Verdict Form Should Reinforce
the Instructions
Particularly if the instructions are not
provided to the jurors in writing, the only
written reflection of the court's instructions
that the jurors will have with them during
deliberations will be the verdict form.
Needless to say , it is essential that the implicit or explicit messages of the verdict
form reinforce the scrupulous caution
about imposing death towards which all of
the defense instructions will have aimed.
The precise contents of the verdict form
may well need to vary, depending on the
facts of the case and the likely concerns
of the jurors (as well as on the requirements of state law). Whenever (and
in whatever respects) counsel believe that
the jury's performance will be enhanced by
a clearer understanding of the steps they
are to undertake in reaching a verdict,

22. This instruction is taken from Seminar Materials ,
Part IV .E. , at II.
23 . This instruction would probably need to be harmonized with an instruction on nonunanimity,
if the latter were given as well .

however, it is likely to be helpful and
arguably constitutionally necessary for the
verdict form itself to remind the jurors of
the information counsel wish them to
remember.
The jurors may be required, for example, to determine the existence of aggravating circumstances; determine the
existence of mitigating circumstances;
weigh them together; determine whether
to grant mercy; and determine, ultimately,
whether life or death is the appropriate
sentence. If so, then the verdict form might
well require the jury to state its decision
on each of these issues, and might alsoif this information would be helpfulremind them of the burden of proof that
must be met as to each one.
For similar reasons, it may be appropriate to require the jury to state explicitly in the verdict form, for each
aggravating circumstance, whether it
found that circumstance present or absent.
This requirement of explicitness may be
useful in clarifying the record for appeal,
and it may also force the jurors to focus
more thoroughly on each of the circumstances in question. It is less clear,
however, that a similar requirement as to
mitigating circumstances would be advisable, since the more rigidly the jurors decision on mitigation is structured the less free
jurors may feel to give appropriate weight
to nonstatutory, even inarticulate, factors
calling for life.
Again for similar reasons, it may be
useful to require each juror to sign a verdict of death. The same requirement could
also be imposed on intermediate decisions
(such as the presence of aggravating circumstances) that contribute to the ultimate
verdict on death.
The following verdict form embodies
rather stringent quidance on the various
steps in the sentencing decision: 24
SAMPLE VERDICT FORM
Circle the appropriate alternative
in each question that you answer.
Begin with the first question; do not
go on to subsequent questions if you

24 . I am grateful to James Liebman for many suggestions which I have incorporated in drafting
this form, and for his pointing out the critical
importance of the verdict form itself.
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s~
are instructed not to do so based on
your answers to earlier questions .
1. (We unanimously fmd) (We do
not unanimously find) beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating circumstance of
as alleged .25

Foreman
UNLESS YOU FIND THE EXISTENCE OF AT LEAST ONE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE
BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT , (NAME OF DEFENDANT) WILL BE SENTENCED
TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT
WITHOUT PAROLE. IN THAT
CASE, DO NOT ANSWER ANY
FURTHER QUESTIONS.

***
2. (We unanimously find) (We do
not unanimously find) by a preponderance of the evidence that the
mitigating circumstance of _ _
does exist. 26

CIRCUMST ANCE(S) WHICH
YOU HAVE FOUND, (NAME OF
DEFENDANT)
WILL
BE
SENTENCED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT PAROLE.
IN THAT CASE , DO NOT
ANSWER ANY FURTHER
QUESTIONS.

***
4. (We unanimously agree) (We
do not unanimously agree) that
mercy should not be granted to
(name of defendant) .

UNLESS YOU UNANIMOUSLY
AGREE THAT MERCY SHOULD
NOT BE GRANTED TO (NAME
OF DEFENDANn, (NAME OF
DEFENDANT)
WILL
BE
SENTENCED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT PAROLE.
IN THAT CASE , DO NOT
ANSWER ANY FURTHER
QUESTIONS .

***

3. (We unanimously fipd) (We do
not unanimously find) beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating
circumstance(s) we have found
outweigh the mitigating circumstance(s) we have found .

5 . (We unanimously agree) (We
do not unanimously agree) beyond
a reasonable doubt that the imposition of death in the manner provided
by law on (name of defendant) is
justified and appropriate in the circumstances of this case.

Foreman
Foreman
UNLESS YOU UNANIMOUSLY
FIND BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT THAT THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMST ANCE(S)
WHICH YOU HAVE FOUND
OUTWEIGH THE MITIGATING

25. Provide a separate question for each aggravating
circumstance.
26 . Provide a separate question for each statutory and
nonstatutory mitigating circumstance proffered
by the defendant .
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***
6 . (We unanimously agree) (We
do not unanimously agree) that
(name of defendant) should be
sentenced to death in the manner
provided by law.

Foreman

Foreman

Foreman

***

WITHOUT PAROLE. IN THAT
CASE , YOU ARE NOT TO
ANSWER ANY FURTHER
QUESTIONS .

IF YOU DO NOT UNANIMOUSLY AGREE THAT THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH IN THE MANNER PROVIDED BY LAW ON
(NAME OF DEFENDANT) IS
JUSTIFIED AND APPROPRIATE
IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF
THIS CASE, (NAME OF DEFENDANn WILL BE SENTENCED
TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT

27 . Provide a separate line for the signature of each
juror.

DO NOT ANSWER QUESTION 6
UNLESS THE JURY HAS (I)
FOUND AT LEAST ONE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE
BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT; (2) FOUND BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT
THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMST ANCE(S) YOU HAVE
FOUND OUTWEIGH THE
MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE(S) YOU HAVE FOUND;
(3) FOUND UNANIMOUSLY
THAT MERCY SHOULD NOT BE
GRANTED TO (NAME
DEFENDANn; AND (4) ~~· .. rn "
THAT THE IMPOSITION OF
DEATH PENALTY ON
OF DEFENDANT) IS .~ .......,..,=,
AND APPROPRIATE IN
CIRCUMSTANCES OF
CASE, BEYOND A
ABLE DOUBT , AND
FOREMAN HAS SO
BY COMPLETING THE
TIONS ABOVE AND
HIS OR HER NAME
EACH QUESTION.

Conclusion
This article does not by any means
all of the instructions that may
helpful in a capital case. That task is
that only the lawyers in each case
accomplish- and that they must
complish in order to safeguard the
and the life, of their client.
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